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State of Utah 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARCHIE L. LARSEN and LEE H. 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 21, 1936, the plaintiff filed a complaint 
in the District Court of Duchesne County, State of Utah 
against Archie L. Larsen and Lee H. Whitlock, a claimed 
partnership, for claimed delinquent sales tax due the 
State of Utah. Summons was issued and on August 19, 
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1936, was personally served upon the defendant, Archie 
L. Larsen. Thereafter, on November 13, 1936, a default 
certificate was entered by the clerk of the court, wherein 
it was stated that in the action Archie L. Larsen and 
Lee H. Whitlock, a partnership, had been served with 
process and had failed to appear and answer plaintiff's 
complaint and that the time allowed by law for answering 
had expired and that the default of the defendants, Archie 
L. Larsen and Lee H. Whitlock, a partnership, in the 
premises was duly entered according to law. (Tr. 1-10-
11-13 Ab. 1-2-3.) 
On November 19, 1936, judgment was entered in 
the action, wherein it was again stated that the defend-
ants, Archie L. Larsen and Lee H. Whitlock, a partner-
ship, had been regularly served with process, had failed 
to appear and answer to the complaint, the time for an- -~ 
swering had expired and the default of the defendants 
in the premises had been duly entered according to law 
and ordering judgment against the defendants in the 
sum of $2,082.79, with interest and court costs. (Tr. 14; 
Ab. 4.) 
Nothing further was done in the matter so far as the 
defendant, Whitlock, was concerned until December 24, 
1936, when a summons and return was filed with the 
clerk of the court. The return of summons stated that 
the sheriff received the summons on August 22, 1936 and 
served the same upon Lee H. Whitlock, one of the part-
ners of a partnership, the within named defendant, per-
sonally, by delivering to and leaving with said defendant 
in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, a 
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true copy of the su1nn1ons on the 17th day of December, 
1936 and that at the time of the service of a copy of 
the sun11nons served, he endorsed the date and place of 
service and added his name and official title thereto. The 
return was dated December 18, 1936. Thereafter, on 
:Jiarch 7, 1938, a default certificate was entered and filed 
by the clerk, purporting to enter the default of Lee H. 
\Vhitlock, individually, in the premises. Thereafter, a 
second judgment was made, entered and filed in the 
cause, ordering, adjudging and decreeing that plaintiff 
have judgment against each of the defendants individual-
ly in the Rum of $2082.79, with interest thereon at the 
rate of 1% per month from the date thereof until paid. 
(Tr.15-16-22-23; Ab. 5-6-7.) 
On :J1arch 8, 1939, the defendant, Lee H. Whitlock, 
by his attorneys, appearing specially for the purposes of 
the motion, filed a motion, supported by the affidavit of 
Lee H. Whitlock, to vacate, set aside and quash the al-
leged or pretended service of summons upon the defend-
ant, Whitlock, for the reason that summons in the cause 
had not been served upon him. The affidavit is to the effect 
that summons had not at any time been served upon Mr. 
Whitlock either by serving the same upon him personally 
or hy leaving a copy of the summons at his usual place 
of abode; namely, 1207 South 15th East Street, Salt Lake 
Cit~·. Utah~ with some suitable person or at any other 
place or in any other manner or way anrl that the return 
of summons filed in the action on December 2-t, 1936, 
signerl h~' l\L Landau, as deputy sheriff, stating that he 
Rerverl the summons on affiant on December 17, 1936, 
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is wholly and entirely false, as said M. Landau did r 
serve said summons or copy of the summons or any co 
of any complaint upon Mr. Whitlock on December : 
1936 or upon any other date or at any other time eitb 
prior or subsequent thereto or in any manner or w~ 
and, further, that no other person or party ever serv 
summons upon him in any manner or way. The affida1 
was not denied by the plaintiff. (Tr. 26-27; Ab. 7-8-9-1 
At the time of the hearing upon the motion, eviden 
was introduced by the defendant, Whitlock, in support 
his motion. At the beginning of the testimony of :ru 
Whitlock, the plaintiff made the following objections: 
''MR. BROWN: Now I would like to ent 
an objection at this time, Your Honor, please, 
all of the testimony that is going to be taken wi 
respect to his motion, as it is our contention tb 
the court should not hear this motion at this tin 
and it is entirely out of place." (Tr. 42; Ab. 1 
The only other objection made by plaintiff was rna 
at the conclusion of the testimony of Oscar W. Moy 
Jr., a witness for appellant, which was as follows: 
''If your Honor please, we have the same ( 
jection to J\1r. Moyle's testimony as applied to lV 
Whitlock's testimony, that it is incompetent, 
relevant and immaterial and in as much as o 
contention is that this proceeding is out of li 
and not before the ~ourt at this time, we obj~ 
to it." (Tr. 52; Abs. 19) 
The court reserved its ruling upon both objectiOJ 
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By the evidence introduced, it was conclusively es-
tablished that no sun1mons was ever served upon appel-
lant and that the return of the sheriff to the effect that 
sumnl.ons 'vas served upon Mr. Whitlock on December 
17, 1936 was wholly false. There was some evidence to 
the effect that the Sheriff of Salt Lake County left a 
copy of a summons and complaint entitled in this action 
in the business office of appellant at 219 South Main 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, during the absence of Mr. 
\Vhitlock from the State of Utah and that there appeared 
across the face of the copy of summons inclosed in the 
envelope a statement signed by Mr. Landau that the 
summons was served on December 17, 1936, at Salt Lake 
County, Utah, on the defendant, Archie L.' Larsen (Tr. 
60; Abs. 20). It was further conclusively established that 
no summons or copy of complaint had ever been served 
upon the appellant personally or by leaving a copy of 
the summons or complaint at the residence of appellant 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, to-wit, 1207 South 15th East 
Street. It was further shown that Mr. Whitlock was ad-
vised by counsel that the summons and copy of complaint 
left in his office was not an attempt to serve him with 
summons, but was an attempted service upon the de-
fendant, Larsen, as shown by the statement on the face 
of the summons and, further, that the cause of action set 
forth in plaintiff's complaint was against the partnership 
if one existed and would not support a personal judgment 
against appellant except as to his interest in the partner-
ship if, in fact, he was a partner (Tr. 42-3-4-50-2; Abs. 
1 6-19). Plaintiff rlirl not offer an~, evidence to refute 
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or deny any of the matters set forth in the affidavit of 
appellant or the facts orally testified to at the time of 
the hearing conclusively establishing that the return of 
summons was false and that, in fact, no service of any 
kind had ever been made upon appellant. 
Statement of Errors Upon Which Appellant Relies 
for Reversal of the Order of the Court Below 
Appellant has made nine assignments of error upon 
which he relies for a reversal of the order of the court 
made December 21, 1939, denying appellant's motion filed 
March 8, 1939, and refusing to grant appellant the re-
lief prayed for in said motion or any relief (Abs. 21-22). 
Assignments of Error Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are directed 
to the failure of the court to grant said motion filed March 
8, 1939. Assignments of Error Nos. 6, 7 and 8 are di-
rected to the failure of the court either upon the motion 
as made or upon its own motion to vacate and set aside 
the judgment entered against the appellant on March 9, 
1938, when it was conclusively established and shown to 
the court that the court did not have jurisdiction over 
the appellant to enter said judgment against him. As-
signment No. 9 is that the order made December 21, 1939, 
denying appellant's motion was not supported by the 
evidence. Appellant relies upon each and all of these 
errors for a reversal of the order of the court appealed 
from. 
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Statement of Particular Questions Involved 
for Determination 
By reason of the proceedings taken by appellant, is 
he entitled to the relief prayed for or for any relief~ 
The determination of this question necessitates a deter-
mination of the following questions: 
1. Is the attack made by the defendant upon the 
judgment of ~larch 8, 1939 a collateral or a direct attack 
upon the judgment~ 
2. If a collateral attack, will it lie when made within 
a year's time after the entry of judgment when maae in 
the same proceeding and while the court retained juris-
diction over the matter~ 
3. Should the motion as made be treated as a mo-
tion to vacate the judgment~ 
4. When, as here, the plaintiff permits the appellant 
to conclusively prove and establish that the court was 
without jurisdiction to enter its judgment of March 8, 
1939, should the court on its own motion vacate the judg-
ment~ 
5. Should the trial court have sustained the motion 
and quashed the summons without disturbing the judg-
ment~ 
6. Is appellant's remed~· dependent upon the pro-
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visiOns of Section 104-14-4, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, and must he, therefore, submit himself to the juris-
diction of the court and make a showing of a good defense 
to the action, or is he entitled to relief wholly independent 
of the provisions of said section~ 
ARGUMENT 
The Attack Made by the Defendant Upon the Judg-
ment of March 8, 1939 Is a Direct Attack Upon the 
Judgment and When It Was Shown That the Return 
of Summons Was False, it Became the Duty of the 
Court to Quash the Service of the Summons. 
Appellant contends that under the rules and prac-
tice of the courts of this state and the decisions of this 
Honorable Court any proceeding brought in the same ac-
tion attacking the validity or effect of a purported judg-
ment is a direct attack thereon and that, being a direct 
attack, the court may hear extrinsic evidence going to 
the validity or invalidity of the judgment particularly 
with respect to matters directed to the jurisdiction of the 
court over the subject matter of the action and to the 
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant. 
It cannot be denied that the proceedings here brought by 
appellant directly attack the validity of the judgment. 
Regardless of the particular name given to the proceed-
ing, it did, in fact, directly attack the validity of the 
judgment by conclusively establishing the lack of juris-
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diction of the court over the person of the defendant. 
)Vhen it was shown to the court that the judgment was 
entered without its having jurisdiction over the person 
of the defendant, the court should and owed a duty to 
appellant to grant the relief sought. 
In the case of Intermill vs. Nash, 94 Utah 271, 75 
Pac. (2d) 157, decided January 13, 1938, this court, 
through its Honorable Justice Larsen, very thoroughly 
reviews the authorities and cases distinguishing between 
"direct" and "collateral" attacks upon judgments and 
fully sets forth the distinguishing features of the two 
types of proceedings. In that case, this court unanimous-
ly held that where the proceedings adopted by the de-
fendant in attacking a judgment are pursued in the pro-
ceedings wherein the judgment is rendered, it is a direct 
attack thereon and that the true test is the purpose of 
the attack and vulnerability of the judgment and not the 
name or the description of the assault itself. We quote 
from Page 279 of the Utah report of the decision: 
" ( 4) Remedies pursued in the proceedings 
wherein the judgment is rendered are direct at-
tacks; otherwise, the:v are looked upon as collat-
eral. (citing cases)" 
And from Page 280 : 
''To differentiate clearly, one must have in 
mind not the terms used, but the reason underlying 
the differentiation. The terms 'direct' and 'col-
lateral,' as used in reference to attacks on judg-
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ments, apply to the purpose of, or the method em-
ployed in, the attack, and not as descriptive of the 
assault itself. The term 'direct attack' means a 
proceeding brought, instituted, or maintained di-
rectly for the purpose, that is, with the direct and 
primary objective, of modifying, setting aside, 
canceling or vacating, or enjoining the enforce-
ment of the judgment. The term 'collateral at-
tack' means the questioning of the validity of a 
judgment in a collateral proceeding; that is, a pro-
ceeding other than the one in which the judgment 
is entered, and which is not brought, instituted, 
or maintained for the express purpose of modify-
ing, setting aside, canceling, or enjoining the exe-
cution of the judgment. It is a denial of, or ques-
tioning the validity of, a judgment, when the judg-
ment is or becomes involved in the cause, only in-
cidentally and collaterally, and its enforcement or 
validity is not the primary issue in or purpose of 
the proceeding.'' 
And Page 285 from the concurring opinion of the Hon-
orable Justice Wolfe: 
''There have been many confusing statements 
as to direct and collateral attacks on judgments. 
vV e are interested more in the manner of testing 
in any given case whether a judgment may be at-
tacked than in nomenclature. As says the prevail-
ing opinion, generally, a direct attack is one the 
purpose of which is to eliminate what is or pur-
ports to be a judgment, whereas a collateral ~t­
tack attempts not to obliterate the judgment, but 
to avoid the effect of it when used in another suit. 
But I think there is a form of direct attack which 
really only avoids the effect of a purported judg-
ment. In· order to make this more clear, I list the 
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types of direct attacks as I see th~m: (1) that 
attack which attempts to set aside a judgment by 
a motion or proceeding brought in the same suit 
in which the judgment was rendered. (2) * * * *" 
Of course, in the matter at bar, the very validity of 
the judgment is being attacked by this proceeding and 
the very purpose of the proceeding is to invalidate the 
purported judgment against the appellant. It is a pro-
ceeding in the very action in which the judgment is en-
tered and is within the time that the court retains juris-
diction of the cause. 
The case of Norton vs. Atchison, etc. RR Company, 
97 Cal. 388, 32 Pac. 452, is probably the leading and most 
cited case on the question of proceedings brought after 
judgment to obtain relief from a purported judgment for 
failure of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant 
when such failure of jurisdiction does not appear upon 
the face of the judgment roll. The proceeding followed 
in that case was very similar to the proceeding followed 
by appellant. In that case, after entry of judgment, the 
defendant filed a motion to quash the service of sun1mons, 
to set aside and vacate the default of the defendant and to 
set aside and vacate the judgment which had been entered 
against it. The court, after holding that the proceeding 
pursued was not brought under Section 473 of the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure, which is identical with 
our Section 104-14-4, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and 
after holding that the evidence conclusively established 
that the defendant had not been served with summons in 
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the action, on Page 391 of the California report of the 
case, states: 
"It was clearly, then, the duty of the court to 
quash the service of the summons, when it ap-
peared to it that the return of such service was 
false; and the vacating of the judgment was an in-
cident which necessarily followed, provided that 
the proceeding by motion by which this result was 
sought to be accomplished was a proper one.'' 
(Italics ours.) 
The court then proceeded to say that the defendant 
did not base his claim to relief on his own mistake, his 
inadvertence or surprise, but based it on the ground that 
the judgment was void and the motion used was the 
proper remedy. Further, the court states on Page 393: 
'' 'Vhere a return shows that a non-resident 
was personally served with sun1mons within the 
state, and it is made to appear to the court that 
such return was false, it would be strange if, within 
a reasonable time, the court could not, upon appli-
cation, set aside the service or the false return of 
service and vacate the judgment.'' 
It is clear from this case that the attack is really 
made upon the service or false service of summons and 
that the vacating of the judgment is a mere formality or 
incident which necessarily follows upon the quashing or 
setting aside of the service of the summons. The mo-
tion made by the appellant in the case at bar clearly is 
an attack upon the judgment though the vacating of 
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the judgment has not been expressly requested therein. 
The very foundation of the judgment is attacked. Cer-
tainly, it is a direct attack 'upon it. 
See also Baldwin vs. Burt, 74 N. W. 594,54 Neb. 287, 
Page 595: 
''The order or decree of the District Court 
quashing the officer's return on the summons, is, 
in effect, an order vacating the foreclosure de-
cree. It is true, the court does not expressly say 
that the foreclosure decree is vacated or set aside, 
but precisely the same result follows from the or-
der as if it was couched in those express terms. 
To say that the order under review is not one va-
cating the foreclosure decree is to discredit en-
tirely the purpose and effect of the order. * * * * 
When the court madf! the order ~under considera-
tion quashing the officer's return, the foreclosure 
decree fell of itself." (Italics ours.) 
If the Attack Made by the Defendant Upon the 
Judgment Is Held to Be a Collateral Attack, It Will 
Lie When Directed Against a Void Judgment when 
Made Within a Year's Time After the Entry of Judg-
ment in the Same Proceeding and While the Court 
Retains Jurisdiction Over the Proceeding. 
There is conclusive authority holding that where a 
judgment is void as distinguished from being voidable, 
that is, where there has been a service of summons upon 
the defendant and the service of sun1mons is defective in 
:-;orne particular but not absolutely void as in this case, 
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the judgment may be attacked either collaterally or di-
rectly if the attack is made within the period of time 
that the court retains jurisdiction over the cause even 
though the defect does not appear upon the face of the 
record. 
Gray vs. Hall, 255 Pac. 246, (Calif.), Page 252: 
"It cannot be denied that, in those cases in 
which judgments have been rendered without any 
or insufficient service, or where the party not only 
has had no opportunity, but is so ignorant of any 
proceeding against him as not to have been able 
to avail himself of the remedies which the law 
gives him until he has lost them all, the judgment 
is absolutely void. Such a judgment may be at-
tacked at any time, directly or collaterally. People 
vs. Harrison, 84 Cal. -607-608, 24 Pac. 311. '' 
Bancroft Code Pleading Practice and Remedies, 10-
year Supplement, Volume 2, Page 1795, Paragraph 963: 
''Effect of Irregularities and Defects Gener-
ally. Defects in the summons or service are not 
available on collateral attack unless they are such 
as to render the judgment absolutely void.'' 
(Italics ours.) 
There being no service of summons of any nature 
made upon the appellant in this case and he having not 
appeared therein in any manner or way, it is clear that 
the judgment here is void and not merely voidable. 
33 c. J. 1082: 
''A personal judgment rendered against a de-
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fendant without servire of process upon him, or 
other sufficient legal notice to him, is without jur-
isdiction and void, unless he has appeared volun-
tarily, because jurisdiction of the person is essen-
tial in such cases, and constructive service is in-
sufficient to give jurisdiction in personam.'' 
33 c. J. 1080: 
"Fonnal process or notice served in the man-
ner authorized or required by law is essential to 
support a judgment; mere informal knowledge of 
the pendency of the action is not sufficient. Thus, 
a judgment is a mere nullity where service is 
made upon a third person instead of upon the 
actual defendant, notwithstanding defendant had 
actual knowledge of the action and the attempted 
service.'' 
We do not admit that the appellant had even in-
formal knowledge of any pending suit against him for 
personal judgment and the evidence produced conclu-
sively shows that the appellant was advised by counsel 
that no such action was pending against him. 
We, therefore, contend, as hereinabove stated, that 
it is wholly immaterial in this case whether the proced-
ure followed by the appellant is termed by the court as 
a collateral or direct attack on the judgment, for the 
reason that the proceeding is brought within a year's 
time as permitted by law while the court still had juris-
diction in the matter and where, as here, it has been 
conclusively established that the court had no jurisdlc-
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tion whatsoever over the appellant to enter the judgment 
against him. 
Plaintiff Permitted the Appellant to Conclusively 
Prove and Establish That the Court Was Without 
Jurisdiction to Enter Its Judgment of March 8, 1939 
and the Manner of Attack, Therefore, Is Immaterial. 
The plaintiff did not file any reply or denial of any 
kind to the sworn affidavit of the appellant conclusively 
establishing that the return of summons upon which the 
judgment was based is utterly false nor did the plaintiff 
offer any evidence to refute the oral evidence presented 
at the hearing upon the motion to the same effect. The 
only objections made were as set forth on Pages 14 and 
19 of the abstract of record. The first objection which 
was presented only to the introduction of the oral evi-
dence was that the court "should not bear this motion 
at this time and it is entirely out of place.'' The other 
objection was that the evidence was incompetent, irrele-
vant and immaterial and that the proceeding was out 
of line and not before the court at the time. The reasons, 
if any, why the court should not hear the motion at the 
time, or why the motion was out of place or why the 
proceeding was out of line and not before the court at 
the time of the hearing or why the evidence was incompe-
tent, irrelevant or immaterial do not appear in either of 
the objections or elsewhere in the record. We contend 
that the objections made if, in fact, the proceeding was 
technically objectionable, being directed to the quashing 
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of the sun1mons and not to the vacating of the judgment 
in express terms, were insufficient to raise any question 
as to the technical form of the motion, especially in 
light of the fact that the facts stated in the i}.ffidavit 
supporting the motion were not denied. The objections 
were directed only to the offering of oral evidence and 
did not attack the motion itself or the affidavit filed in 
support thereof. The motion and the affidavit without 
the oral evidence introduced were sufficient to entitle 
appellant to the relief sought. 
It has been definitely held that where the evidence 
is undisputed and is established beyond all controversy, 
the judgment may be vacated at any time or in any man-
ner either by direct attack or collateral attack, the rule 
being the same as when the judgment appears to be void 
upon its face. We quote from Hill vs. City Cab and 
Transfer, 79 Cal. 188, 21 Pac. 728, Page 191 : 
"But this rule is not that a judgment which 
is void will be enforced as if it were valid, but 
that it cannot be shown to be void except in certain 
ways. If the party, however, should admit the 
facts which show the judgment to be void, or if 
he should allow them to be established without 
opposition, then, as a question of law, upon such 
facts, we do not see why the case is not like that 
where a judgment is void upon its face. In the 
present case, the findings established the fact 
that there was no service of summons upon or 
authorized appearance by the defendant. And 
none of the evidence is brought up, nor does the 
question appear to have been raised by exception 
or demurrer or in any other way. The facts, there-
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fore, must be taken to be established hy the record 
beyond all controversy and, upon such facts, the 
la~ is that the judgment is void." 
The· above case was clearly a case of a collateral 
attack upon the judgment, the invalidity of the judgment 
being set up as a defense to a separate suit brought for 
the renewal of the judgment. 
See also People vs. Harrison, 107 Cal. 541, 40 Pac. 
956, in which case proceedings attacking the judgment 
were brought three years after judgment. The attack 
was clearly an indirect or collateral attack thereon and 
the defects did not appear upon the face of the record. 
The court held that where the facts showing no service 
were admitted or not denied it remained a question of 
law as to the character of the service, quoting with ap-
proval the above quotation from the Hill vs. City Cab 
and Transfer case. 
As above stated, the plaintiff has not in any manner 
or way denied the facts set forth in the sworn affidavit 
attached to appellant's motion, which conclusively show 
no service of summons, and, further, introduced no evi-
dence upon the hearing of this cause to refute appellant's 
oral evidence conclusively establishing that no service 
of summons was made upon the appellant or appearnce 
made by him in the action. The above authorities are, 
therefore, applicable. 
Appellant's Remedy Is Independent of Section 104-
14-4 and He Need Not Submit Himself to the Juris-
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diction of the Court or Support His Motion with a 
Showing of a Good Defense to the Action. 
The Supreme Court of California, construing Section 
473 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which is 
identical to Section 104-14-4 of our Revised Statutes of 
1933, has definitely held that the relief provided for by 
said Section -173 of the California Code is applicable only 
where the party attempting to attack a judgment or 
process is proceeding on the ground of excusable neglect, 
mistake, inadvertence or surprise on the part of the party 
so attacking the judgment or proceeding and that where 
the attack is on the ground that the court has never ob-
tained jurisdiction over the party due to no neglect of 
any kind upon the part of said party, he is entitled to 
relief wholly independent of said Section 473. 
The case of Norton vs. Atchison, etc. RR Company, 
hereinabove cited, is clear authority for this contention. 
On Page 390 of the California report, the Supreme Court 
of California states: 
"The recent case of Jacks v. Baldez, 97 Cal. 
91, 1night also be cited in support of what appel-
lant deems to be the correct position. But those 
authorities relate to cases which come clearly 
within, or should have been brought under, the 
provisions of said section 4 73. rrhe main pro-
vision of that section is, that a court may relieve 
a party from a judgment taken against him 
'through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or ex-
cusable neglect'; and it is quite clear that the pro-
vision just quoted has no application to the ground 
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upon which respondent moved in the case at bar. 
Defendant here is not asking relief from its neg-
lect or mistake or default or any character; its 
contention is, that the court has no jurisdiction 
over it, and no power to compel it to answer to 
the action. It does not ask to be allowed to come 
in and answer, but contends that, in its situation, 
it cannot be called upon to answer; therefore, 
there can be demanded of it no affidavit of merits. 
In the cases cited the parties making application 
to set aside the judgment confessed some neglect 
or misconduct from which they sought to be re-
lieved, and thus come clearly within the provisions 
of said section, and, of course, were compelled to 
comply with the provisions of the section, under 
the construction which the court had given them.'' 
The California court also quotes the following from 
Freeman on Judgments, Paragraph 108: 
"In all cases an affidavit of merits must be 
made and filed, except where it appears that the 
court has never acquired jurisdiction of the mov-
ing party, and that its judgment against him is 
void; but in this class of cases he is entitled to 
relief, independently of those statutes.'' 
The case of Vaughn vs. Pine Creek Tungsten Com-
pany, 265 Pac. 491, is a later California case holding to 
the same effect, and there are other California cases so 
holding, and our own Supreme Court in the case of 
Atkinson vs. Atkinson, 43 Utah 53, likewise has held 
that, where the court had no jurisdiction over either the 
subject matter or the party, the party affected could ob-
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tain relief wholly independent of that section. We quote 
from the ~\tkinson case as follows, Page 56: 
"\Yhere a judgment is obtained by default 
upon constructive service, and the defendant 
moves to set the judgment aside by motion within 
the year allowed by our statute, or if he seeks to 
be permitted to open up the default judgment for 
the purpose of making a defense to the original 
action upon the ground of the excusable neglect 
or inadvertence, or for some other sufficient cause, 
the practice is well settled that, in order to have 
the judgment set aside and the cause reopened, 
he ordinarily must submit himself to the jurisdic-
tion of the court, and must also set up a good de-
fense to the action in the form of an affidavit or 
answer. But is this the rule without exception, 
and must a party also do this in a case wherein 
the plaintiff has been guilty of fraud in inducing 
the court to assume jurisdiction of the action in 
which the default judgment is entered, or where, 
as here, the court never acquired jurisdiction of 
the person, because the order for service by pub-
lication and the pretended summons were void~ 
If a plaintiff can enforce such a rule, then he in 
a divorce action would be permitted to take ad-
vantage of his own wrong, since he could cmnpel 
the defendant in such an action to submit his or 
her person to the jurisdiction of the court, when 
neither personal nor subject-matter jurisdiction 
(the marriage which constitutes the res) could be 
obtained in any other way." 
"There may be some good reason why a 
party may not desire to have the case tried in a 
particular court or state, and if so such person· 
need not, under circumstances like those in this 
case, subject his person to the jurisdiction of the 
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court in order to be entitled to the relief sougl 
Under such circumstances the respondent was E 
titled to have the judgment set aside as a matt 
of right and not as a matter of grace. See De 
bins v . .:\1cNamary, 113 Ind. 54, 14 N. E. 887, 
Am .St. Rep. 626; 1 Black on Judgments ( 2d Ec 
section 348. ' ' 
From the above authorities, it is very clear th 
where,· as here, the court has not obtained jurisdicti1 
over the defendant to render a judgment, the defenda 
is entitled to relief wholly independent of Section 1C 
14-4 of our Revised Statutes. Appellant is not claimi1 
relief because of any mistake, inadvertance or excusal 
neglect on his part as he has not been guilty of a1 
such mistake, inadvertence or neglect. He is mere 
claiming and asking relief against a void judgment e 
tered against him without jurisdiction and without noti 
of any kind to him of the pendency of the proceeding. 
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully contends th 
the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion and 
refusing to grant appellant any relief from the vo 
judgment entered against him and that this Honorab 
Court will rectify said errors. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & MOYLE 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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